NTSB Identification: LAX06CA295.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, September 18, 2006 in Chandler, AZ
Aircraft: Beech A36, registration: N9067E
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
On September 18, 2006, at
1100 mountain standard time, a Beech A36 airplane
, N9067E, veered from the runway during landing and impacted a parked,
unoccupied airplane at the Chandler Municipal Airport (CHD), Chandler, Arizona.
The airplane was substantially damaged and the certificated flight instructor
and
the private pilot under instruction were not injured. The airplane was operated
by
the Mesa Pilot Development, Inc., Mesa, Arizona, under the provisions of 14 CFR
Part 91 as an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed,
and
a flight plan had not been filed for the local flight that originated from the
Williams
Gateway Airport (IWA) at 0930.
The student was an instrument rated private pilot who was finishing his
commercial pilot training. According to the flight instructor's written
statement,
they were landing at CHD to refuel before returning to IWA. Air traffic control
cleared the flight to land on runway 22R, and as the flight was on base leg,
the instructor noted that they were 100 feet low and 10 knots fast. As the
student (who was positioned in the right seat) flew the airplane from the base
leg to final approach, the airplane overshot the runway to the right and
remained low. The instructor had the student maneuver the airplane back to the
left and level off so they could re-intercept the final approach centerline.
The instructor noted the airplane was low and fast (airspeed indicated 80 knots
on short final), and the student added "little-to-no flare" before
landing. The airplane touched down and bounced before veering "sharply to
the right."
The instructor indicated there was no "verbal communication"
established for the exchange of flight control, and as a result, she believed
they were both attempting to control the airplane. The student added power and
the instructor yelled "No!" and placed the throttle to idle and
attempted to establish directional control. The airplane then collided with a
parked airplane on the ramp and came to rest.
The student's written statement was consistent with that of the instructor's.
The wind was reported as calm by the flight instructor and she reported no
anomalies with the airplane. An examination of the airplane by a Federal
Aviation Administrator (FAA) inspector revealed no anomalies with the rudder or
braking systems.
The FAA defines a stabilized approach as "maintaining a stable speed,
descent rate, vertical flight path and configuration." The Flight Safety
Foundation (FSF), in part, indicates that an approach is stabilized when all of
the following criteria are met:
"1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path,
2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct
flight path,
3. The aircraft is not more than 20 knots (indicated) greater than the
reference landing speed and not less than that reference landing speed.
4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration..."
In addition, the FSF recommends that if an approach becomes unstabilized below
500 feet above the airplane elevation in visual conditions an immediate
go-around should be conducted.
***************************************
NTSB Identification: LAX07FA012
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, October 18, 2006 in Prescott, AZ
Aircraft: Piper PA-42, registration: N121CS
Injuries: 5 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 18, 2006, at 1347 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-42 (Cheyenne
III), N121CS, was destroyed when its tail section separated in flight while
maneuvering about 16 nautical miles northeast of Prescott, Arizona. The airline
transport pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries and the airplane
was destroyed. The airplane was operated by the pilot under the provisions of
14 CFR Part 91 as an aerial photography flight. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed and a flight plan was not filed for the local flight that
departed the Ernest A. Love Field, Prescott, about 15 minutes before the
accident.
The intent of the flight was to take aerial photographs of a MiG 21 airplane
(N21UT). The pilot of the MiG 21 indicated that he and the Cheyenne pilot
discussed the photo flight the day of the accident, and had established 2,500
to 3,000 feet above ground level (agl) as their minimum altitude and 200 knots
as their minimum airspeed. The MiG and Cheyenne pilot did not establish a
minimum separation distance, as it was not intended to be a formation flight.
The MiG pilot reported that they intended on adjusting the in-flight separation
as the flight progressed.
The MiG pilot reported that he departed the Prescott airport and flew straight
out on a northeast heading. On departure, he experienced a problem retracting
the landing gear and noted that only the nose landing gear successfully
retracted. He recycled the landing gear handle from up to off and back to the
up position, and received a successful gear retraction indication. He notified
the Cheyenne pilot of the landing gear problem, but informed him that he
believed the landing gear was retracted. The Cheyenne pilot indicated that they
would join up with the MiG, look it over and check-out the landing gear, and
let the MiG pilot know what they saw.
The MiG pilot flew the airplane at 9,000 feet mean sea level (msl) in a
30-degree right-hand turn at 200 knots with approach flaps selected
(approximately 25 degrees). He continued to circle in that configuration to
allow the Cheyenne to rendezvous with the MiG. The MiG pilot reported that he
observed the Cheyenne meet up at his 5 o'clock position about 300-400 feet
behind him about the same altitude. The MiG pilot looked forward and when he
looked back to the Cheyenne, he could not see it. About 30 seconds later, he
heard the Cheyenne pilot comment about the right landing gear or gear door, but
the statement was not completed. The MiG pilot waited to hear back from the
Cheyenne pilot, but when he did not receive any additional information, he
asked the Cheyenne pilot to repeat because he didn't understand the last
transmission. The Cheyenne pilot did not respond and the MiG pilot never
received additional information.
The MiG pilot continued flying in that manner and tried to reach the Cheyenne
over the radio. After a couple of minutes he observed a column of smoke rising
from the desert terrain and became concerned about the Cheyenne. The MiG pilot
called the Prescott air traffic controller and asked if they were receiving an
emergency locator transmitter (ELT) because he could not see the Cheyenne,
could not reach him over the radio, and could now see a column of smoke in the
area in which they were flying. The controller reported that they were not
receiving an ELT signal but asked for coordinates for the smoke so they could
send someone to check it out. The MiG pilot provided the coordinates and flew
around a while longer to burn off fuel prior to landing. He informed the
controller that he was having problems with his landing gear so the controller
cleared him for the option.
The MiG pilot landed uneventfully. The MiG was later inspected for contact with
the Cheyenne but no evidence of contact between the two airplanes was noted.
A statement provided by the Prescott airport manager indicated that he was
listening to both aircraft as they taxied and departed the airport. He then
switched frequencies to the air-to-air frequency used by the MiG and Cheyenne
pilot (123.45). He reported hearing the conversation between the MiG and the Cheyenne
pilots, and then heard the Cheyenne pilot indicate that he would "drop
down and go underneath and let you know how it looks" after the MiG pilot
informed him that he had recycled his landing gear and believed they were
retracted.
Radar data from the Seligman, Arizona, RADES facility depicted the MiG in a
right-hand turn. The Cheyenne joined up with the MiG on the inside of the turn
and descended from above the MiG to below it. The Cheyenne's flight path
matched that of the MiG and its last radar return with altitude information
depicted both aircraft at 7,900 feet msl at 1346:47.
The Cheyenne's main wreckage (which included the entire aircraft with the
exception of the upper half of the vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer,
and elevator) was located at a global positioning system (GPS) measured
location of 34 degrees 52.821 minutes north latitude and 112 degrees 15.197
minutes west longitude at a terrain elevation of 4,366 feet msl. The main
wreckage came to rest on a heading of 230 degrees, in an inverted position, and
had sustained fire damage throughout its entirety with the exception of the aft
empennage, lower vertical stabilizer, and rudder. The fuselage and wing skin
had melted allowing investigators to trace the control cables from the cockpit
to the ailerons, rudder, and base of the elevator pushrod. No anomalies with
the cables were noted. In addition, the engine controls were traced from the
cockpit to their respective engines.
The T-tail section of the airplane came to rest at a GPS measured location of
34 degrees 52.420 minutes north latitude and 112 degrees 15.241 minutes west
longitude at a terrain elevation of 4,466 feet msl. The tail section included
the upper portion of the vertical stabilizer, the horizontal stabilizer and elevator,
which all remained intact and came to rest on the topside of the horizontal
stabilizer/elevator. The tail section did not sustain any fire damage, and was
missing the left elevator counter weight. Movement of the elevator reveled no
binding or pre-existing anomalies.
On October 20, 2006, the tail section was transported to the main wreckage
where they were examined together. Examination of the vertical stabilizer's
front and aft spars revealed that they were bent and twisted to the right. The
rudder was twisted to the right about 180 degrees. All fracture surfaces on the
vertical stabilizer and elevator vertical push-pull tube were irregular and
deformed and did not display any evidence of fatigue cracking or pre-existing
failures.
************************************************
NTSB Identification: LAX07LA011
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, October 18, 2006 in Chandler, AZ
Aircraft: Morrisey 2150A, registration: N5114V
Injuries: 2 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 18, 2006, at 0930 mountain standard time, a Morrisey (Varga) 2150A
airplane, N5114V, impacted terrain during a forced landing near the Stellar
Airpark, Chandler, Arizona. The forced landing was precipitated by a loss of
engine power. The airplane sustained substantial damage; the commercial pilot
and pilot-rated passenger sustained minor injuries. The pilot operated the
airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight. The local
flight originated from the Chandler Municipal Airport (CHD) about 15 minutes
prior to the accident and was destined for the Stellar Airpark (P19). Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed for
the flight.
According to the pilot-rated passenger, who was the registered owner of the
airplane, they departed CHD and smelled "something kind of funny."
The pilots noticed that the oil pressure indicator was not registering any
pressure and the engine began to buck. As the flight neared P19, they secured
the engine and declared an emergency to CHD's air traffic control tower and
informed them that they were making a forced landing near P19.
The airplane touched down in rough terrain about 300 feet short of runway 35,
which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The Federal
Aviation Administration inspector who responded to the accident site reported
that engine oil was noted on the left side of the cowling, over the left wing,
and down the belly of the airplane. He opened the cowling and noted that the
oil dipstick was in place and the oil filter remained secured to the engine.
Interviews with the owner revealed that the oil was changed 10 days prior to
the accident and the accident flight was the third since that oil change.
The airplane was transported to Air Transport, Phoenix, Arizona, where it will
be examined at a later date.
************************************************
NTSB Identification: LAX07FA021
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, October 25, 2006 in Meadview, AZ
Aircraft: Cirrus SR22, registration: N121LD
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 25, 2006, at 1208 mountain standard time, a Cirrus SR22, N121LD,
reported icing conditions at 13,000 feet mean sea level (msl), disappeared from
radar, and then impacted terrain about 24 nautical miles northeast of Meadview,
Arizona. The pilot was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code
of Federal Regulations Part 91. The instrument rated private pilot and three
passengers sustained fatal injuries and the airplane was destroyed. A
combination of visual and meteorological conditions prevailed along the route
of flight and the airplane was being operated under an instrument flight rules
(IFR) clearance. The pilot departed from Lake Tahoe Airport, South Lake Tahoe,
California, about 1030 Pacific daylight time, and was destined for the Grand
Canyon National Park Airport, Grand Canyon, Arizona.
According to a family friend, the pilot met his wife and two children in the
San Francisco area on October 23. On October 24, they flew to South Lake Tahoe
where they spent the night. On October 25, the day of the accident, the pilot
planned to fly to the Grand Canyon where he and his family would go hiking.
The airplane was last refueled at a fixed base operator at the Reno/Tahoe
International Airport, Reno, Nevada, on October 23. The fueling invoice
indicated that the right and left fuel tanks were topped off with the addition
of 24.1 gallons of fuel. On the invoice, the pilot's estimated departure time
from the airport was noted as 1000 on October 24.
A fixed base operator employee at Lake Tahoe Airport stated that the pilot
arrived at the airport on October 24, from Reno. The airplane was secured to
the ramp and no fueling services were provided. The pilot returned to the
airport the following morning and found frost on the airplane. He and his
family waited while the sun rose and melted the frost accumulation. They
departed about 1030.
The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge, an Safety
Board specialist from the Office of Research and Engineering, two Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors from the Las Vegas Flight Standards
District Office (FSDO), and one investigator from FAA Aircraft Accident
Investigation responded to the accident site on October 26, 2007. Additional
investigative personnel from Cirrus Design Corporation, Ballistic Recovery
Systems (BRS), AmSafe Aviation, and Teledyne Continental Motors, who were
parties to the investigation, responded to the site to assist.
The airplane impacted sloped desert terrain at an elevation of approximately
4,520 feet msl on a westerly heading. All of the flight control surfaces were
attached or partially attached to the structure. There was no fire. The
wreckage was generally confined to the impact area, and except for the area
immediately surrounding the wreckage, minimal ground scarring was observed.
The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) was examined. The parachute was out
of its housing, draped over the empennage and aft fuselage section of the
airframe. Some of the gores (panels that make up the canopy of the parachute)
remained folded. The suspension lines were intact and undamaged. The deployment
cable was continuous from the cockpit handle aft through the fuselage to the
rocket housing area. The rocket and the deployment bag cover were located
approximately 288 feet east of the accident site.
Based on preliminary weather information obtained by a Safety Board
meteorologist, local weather included AIRMETS (Airman's Meteorological
Information) for icing (approximately 65 nautical miles northeast of the
accident site) and moderate turbulence (within the accident site area). In
addition, a convective SIGMET (Significant Meteorological Information) was issued
for an area encompassing the accident site. A convective SIGMET implies severe
or greater turbulence, severe icing, and low-level wind shear.
NTSB Identification: LAX07LA027
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 01, 2006 in Bisbee, AZ
Aircraft: Air Creations Tanarg 912, registration: None
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 01, 2006, about 0930 mountain standard time, an Air Creations
Tanarg 912 unregistered airplane, collided with a steep mountain side near
Bisbee, Arizona. The pilot/owner was operating the unregistered aircraft under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane was destroyed. The
non-certificated pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The
instructional cross-country flight departed from Rodeo, New Mexico, about 0830,
with a panned destination of Bisbee. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed,
and a flight plan had not been filed.
A National Transportation Safety Board investigator interviewed a pilot who was
flying an ultralight in tandem with the accident aircraft. He stated that the
accident pilot was providing instruction to the student pilot on the
cross-country flight to Bisbee. The accident pilot maintained radio
communication with him as both aircraft maneuvered through the valleys that led
to the destination. Throughout the flight, the radio signal was intermittent
due to the contours of the terrain. While en route through the Starvation and
Skeleton Valley, the accident pilot made a radio call to him stating that he
was positioned behind his ultralight at the "4-o'clock" position.
The ultralight pilot further stated that after egressing the valleys he turned
around to scan the surrounding area and could not obtain visual contact of the
accident aircraft. He headed back up the valley and saw smoke behind a mountain
ridge. He circled over the smoke and observed a small brush fire, but did not
discern an aircraft structure. He continued on to Bisbee and attempted to
locate the accident aircraft at the airport to no avail.
The ultralight pilot added that the winds at the time of the accident were calm
and there was no turbulence or mountain wave in the areas they were flying.
*******************************************
NTSB Identification: LAX07LA025
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, November 02, 2006 in Rio Verde, AZ
Aircraft: Olson Vans RV-6, registration: N606RV
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 2, 2006, about 0800 mountain standard time, an Olson Vans RV-6,
N606RV, collided with transmission wires and came to rest inverted in the Verde
River near Rio Verde, Arizona. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The private pilot and passenger were fatally injured.
The airplane sustained substantial damage. The local personal flight originated
from Phoenix Deer Valley Airport, Phoenix, Arizona, about 0700. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan had not been filed.
A helicopter pilot was dispatched after Arizona Public Service received a
report of a temporary power outage that occurred at 0800. He stated that he
overflew transmission wires adjacent to the Verde River. He observed a white
airplane wing about 2 miles downstream (southwest) from the Bartlett Dam. The
wing was positioned 200 yards from transmission wires that ran parallel to the
river. He noted a 10-foot section of the wires had a black coloration and
appeared severely frayed. The pilot added that the frayed section was situated
between the transmission towers, which were spaced about every 0.25 miles.
The airplane came to rest inverted, in a active river that consisted of fresh
water 8 to 10 feet deep.
********************************************
NTSB Identification: LAX07LA037
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 17, 2006 in Flagstaff, AZ
Aircraft: Beechcraft J35, registration: N8246D
Injuries: 1 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 17, 2006, about 1930 mountain standard time, a Beech J35 airplane,
N8246D, lost engine power, and impacted a tree on final approach for runway 21
at the Flagstaff Pulliam Airport (FLG), Flagstaff, Arizona. The commercial
pilot, who was the sole occupant, was seriously injured. The airplane sustained
substantial damage. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a
flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight that originated from
Chinle, Arizona, at an unknown time. The personal flight was conducted under
the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The accident site was located at 35 degrees
09.03 minutes north latitude and 111 degrees 39.48 minutes west longitude.
According to a witness located near the airport, he heard the airplane flying
an approach to the airport. He described the conditions as dark night with
little-to-no illumination from the moon. He heard the airplane's engine surge
and rev loudly three times before going silent. He believed the pilot would be
able to glide the airplane to the airport since he was on final approach;
however, after about 10 seconds following the loss of engine power he heard a
loud crash. He proceeded in the direction of the crash and found the airplane
near one of the outlying lights of the approach lighting system. He approached
the airplane from the left side and noted that the left wing was missing. He
also noted that there was no smell of fuel at the accident site. He checked the
condition of the pilot and then left the scene to get help.
The FLG airport manager was called to the scene of the accident and noted that
the left wing was separated outboard of the left flap and remained 30 feet
above the ground in the tree it impacted. The airplane was facing 180 degrees
from the approach heading. The engine and cockpit sustained significant impact
damage and the cockpit structure as compromised. According to the airport
manager, there was no smell of fuel at the accident site.
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector from the Scottsdale Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO) responded to the accident site on the 18th.
According to the FAA inspector, the left fuel tank had been compromised during
the accident sequence, and the FAA inspector confirmed there was 5 gallons of
fuel in the right fuel tank. He noted that the fuel selector was in the
AUXILIARY tanks position. The inspector removed the inlet and outlet lines from
the fuel manifold and observed no fuel in any line.
The airplane had a total fuel capacity of 60 gallons. Each of the airplane's
main fuel cells were capable of holding 20 gallons of fuel, of which, 17
gallons were usable. The airplane also featured two auxiliary fuel cells (right
and left). Each of these two fuel cells were capable of holding 10 gallons of
fuel, of which, 9.5 gallons were usable. A review of the before landing
checklist in the aircraft flight manual for the accident airplane revealed that
prior to landing, the fuel selector must be positioned to the "MAIN TANK
MORE NEARLY FULL."
According to the pilot's wife, she spoke with the pilot prior to his departure
from Chinle. He informed her that he was not sure if he needed gas or not, but
if he did he would stop at the Holbrook Municipal Airport, Holbrook, Arizona,
to refuel. According to the Holbrook fueling records, the pilot did not
purchase fuel on the 17th. Chinle Municipal Airport does not have fuel
services.