
Piper PA-28 140
Cherokee Stats:
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Horsepower:
150 |
Gross
Weight: 1950 lbs |
|
Top
Speed: 125 kts |
Empty
Weight: 1180 lbs |
|
Cruise
Speed: 117 kts |
Fuel
Capacity: 36.00 gal |
|
Stall
Speed (dirty): 45 kts |
Range:
457 nm |
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Takeoff |
Landing |
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Ground
Roll: 725 ft |
Ground
Roll 485 ft |
|
Over
50 ft obstacle: 1150 ft |
Over
50 ft obstacle: 850 ft |
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|
|
Rate
Of Climb: 820 fpm |
|
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Ceiling:
15000 ft |
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December 2008
“I really don’t like the idea of you
taking this plane to Tahoe,” said the owner of the FBO who had just checked me
out in the school’s Cherokee 140. I gave him reassurances that I was a very
safe and competent pilot and, in fact, I had even flown in and out of the
6,200-foot-elevation airport in a Cessna 150. I was surprised at how
unimpressed he was with this. I doubt the fact that I was a little over 17 years old with less than a 100 flying hours
had anything to do with his attitude. Nonetheless, he allowed me to go but
repeated his mantra of disapproval.
The real problem at the time was that
I couldn’t afford to rent anything more substantial, and I was overly comforted
by the operating handbook’s performance figures even with three passengers on
board. All I had to do was apply the proper procedures for a density altitude
environment and the Cherokee 140 would do the job. I knew the drill. Keep the
weight down, the outside air temperature cool, the mixture properly leaned, and
away we’d go, according to the performance figures. As these figures came
directly from a genuine Piper factory manual they must be true, right?
In fact, it was a flawless flight up
to South Lake Tahoe, and my buddies really enjoyed it. Keeping the airplane
light for taking off the next day was not a problem. As teens, we were pretty
lean, and we did not take any luggage with us other than an overnight toiletry
kit. The fuel burn off on the way up would also help. We spent the night in
Tahoe and had a good old time as only teenage kids can. The next morning, much
to my consternation, we got back to the airport later than I had planned.
I had wanted to takeoff at 7 a.m.,
but it was now three hours later, and the outside air temperature had climbed
to the low 70s, giving me a density altitude around 8,000 feet. To make matters
worse, I had hoped to take off toward the lake and lower terrain, but the winds
were out of the south, which meant that I now had to take off toward the trees.
My well-intentioned game plan was falling apart. Still, according to the book,
I should be airborne about halfway down the 7,000-foot runway.
I ran the engine up and leaned for
best power. The aircraft’s lack of acceleration was notable. Did I leave the
parking brake on? We slowly reached flying speed and lifted off after a
3,000-foot takeoff roll. The problem now was that we were flying in ground
effect and the plane did not want to climb. Passing the end of the runway, the
tree line was rapidly approaching. I was able to nurse out just enough lift to
barely clear the trees. I remember having all too clear a view of the
individual tree branches passing below my wings. An intermittent stall warning
horn was playing in the background. I think it was trying to play “Taps.”
The one thing I did right was to
maintain flying speed and not let the airplane stall, but not getting us all
killed was more luck than skill. I was able to gingerly turn the plane toward
the lake where I could leisurely circle for altitude for the ride home. Both my
passengers and myself were pretty shaken by what I still consider to be my
closest call in more than 35 years of
flying. (Since the pilot was only 17 years old,
he could not have even been a gleam in his parent’s eyes).
This may seem like a story about a
density altitude encounter, and to a certain extent it is, but in an
understated way it is more about how an accident, or in my case a
near-accident, is seldom the result of one single mistake or circumstance. In
accident investigation, we call this the “causal chain.” This is when a series
of independent events start to link together and pave a path for the accident
that is yet to come. The problem is that these connected links are easier
identified after an accident has occurred. It is the savvy pilot who can
recognize the potential links early on and take the necessary corrective action
to keep an accident chain from forming.
In my story, it is pretty easy to see
the chain being forged link by link: an inexperienced pilot, an underpowered
airplane, a delayed departure, and having to take off toward obstructions all
in a high-density-altitude environment. How about the FBO owner who said “I
really don’t like the idea of you taking this plane to Tahoe.” By knowing the
risks, he became the first link and could have stopped the chain from forming
altogether had he given a more appropriate response such as “I’ll give a loaded
firearm to a drunken chimp before I’d ever let you take this plane to Tahoe.”
We can’t change history or control
everything we would like to, but we can recognize when subtle and sometimes
innocuous circumstances start to conspire to do us great harm. The trick is to
acknowledge the circumstances, recognize the path being formed, and break the
chain before it breaks you. I was lucky. I came up one link short of disaster
those many years ago.
Ken Steiner is an ATP/CFI with more
than 3,500 hours flying experience. He’s also a claims manager for U.S.
Aircraft Insurance Group and has performed aircraft accident investigations for
more than 28 years.